The current government is preventing the media from publishing many parts of the recently released UN Human Rights Commission report, or is forcing any media outlet to delete even if it partially publishes it. Some of these parts are highlighted below.
During the protests, sections of the mob targeted police and Awami League officials or supporters with # lynchings and other serious retaliatory # violence, which in many cases appeared to be a direct response to unlawful violence committed by or blamed on the victims.
For example, on July 19 in Uttara, a mob severely beat the former mayor of Gazipur and lynched one of his associates after he and several other armed Awami League supporters allegedly opened fire on protesters.
The most serious incidents occurred from August 4. As the former government gradually lost control of the country, incidents of retaliatory violence against the Awami League and the police increased.
In Raiganj, Sirajganj district, a group of men armed with machetes and rods, who, according to witnesses, were dressed differently than other protesters in the area, attacked the local Awami League office and set it on fire. The attackers killed five local Awami League officials and a journalist. One of the slain officials was first publicly humiliated—he was made to sit up by the ear, then beaten to death.
On the same day, another large group of youths attacked Enayetpur station in the same district. According to police sources, 15 policemen were killed in that incident.
On August 5, three police stations in Feni district were set on fire and looted, and 16 policemen were attacked. Earlier, on August 4, 300-400 armed Awami League supporters attacked student protesters in Feni, killing eight protesters and seriously injuring 79, according to police.
In Rangpur, armed Awami League supporters, including an Awami League city councilor, opened fire on protesters. A mob then beat the councilor and an aide to death and dragged the councilor's body through the streets.
In Narsingdi, a group of angry mobs chased and beat six Awami League supporters to death. It was alleged that they had opened fire on the protesters.
- Retaliatory violence escalated after Sheikh Hasina left the country on August 5. Violent mobs attacked and burned down many police stations. According to Bangladesh Police, 450 of the 639 police stations across the country were destroyed or damaged in the attacks.
In many cases, police officers fled or were allowed to leave by their superiors. On the other hand, some police officers were beaten to death or otherwise killed.
- When the Savar police station was attacked and set on fire on August 5, police officers were able to save themselves by firing #s. Several police stations were attacked and set on fire in Sylhet. In one, police officers were able to protect themselves by taking shelter in a local mosque. In Rampura, a local imam helped lead police officers to a safe place.
- On August 5, in response to indiscriminate police firing at Jatrabari police station, a violent mob from the area hurled petrol bombs at the station, attacked it, then set it on fire and looted it. Two RAB officers and at least four Ansar/VDP and police officers were killed by the militants. Other RAB and police officers escaped with injuries and were sheltered by locals. A violent mob attacked Uttara Purba police station. The attackers killed four police officers. In Ashulia, the frenzied mob beat at least three police officers in retaliation for the police killing of protesters and burned their bodies. In all three places, the bloody bodies of the slain police officers were hung in public places.
Since 5 August, violent mobs have attacked Awami League offices and activists. Testimony given to OHCHR suggests that #BNP and #Jamaat #Islami supporters were also involved. #BNP has publicly admitted that some local leaders and activists of #Chhatra Dal and #Yubadal had participated in the retaliatory violence and on 10 August it announced that it had expelled 44 local leaders and activists.
- Since early August, the Awami League president's office in Dhanmondi, Dhaka, has been the target of a series of attacks. Police and party workers repelled the attacks. On August 5, after all the employees had left, a violent mob stormed the office and burned it down. On the same day, an Awami League supporter in Jatrabari was stabbed to death by a group of attackers, whom the victim's family identified as BNP members.
- Violent mobs vandalized, looted, or burned down the homes and businesses of Awami League leaders, government officials, or their immediate family members. In one incident, BNP supporters attacked the business of a senior Jubo League leader. Testimony given to OHCHR shows that they took his parents hostage and a local BNP leader was held for ransom. BNP supporters occupied the business and attacked a family member who tried to file a police complaint. In another incident, a hotel owned by a local Awami League leader in Jessore was burned down. About 24 people were killed. Opposition supporters attacked and vandalized the Prime Minister's official residence, Ganabhaban. Another group looted and attacked the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum, which commemorates Sheikh Hasina's father and Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family, with petrol bombs.
- Another incident of retaliatory sexual violence was documented by OHCHR. In August, a woman was detained by two men who were different in age and dress from the other students. They identified the woman as being associated with the Chhatra League. The men insulted her with obscene comments, pulled her clothes, repeatedly slapped her in the face and punched her in the chest. A few days later, the same woman was attacked for the second and more serious time. The attackers surrounded her, tore her clothes, touched her breasts and private parts and finally raped her. She was not treated in any hospital due to her political affiliation.
In other incidents, female supporters of the Awami League and Chhatra League received verbal and social media threats of rape. For the reasons mentioned, OHCHR believes that there are many more cases of sexual violence that OHCHR has not been able to document. Following the protests, some women who were in leadership positions or had visible profiles feared threats or reprisals, which forced them to cover their faces and hair in an attempt to hide their identities.
In the days following Sheikh Hasina’s fall, many police officers were afraid to report to work and in many places the police were virtually ineffective. This facilitated further retaliatory violence and opportunistic crimes. Although the peak of retaliatory violence appears to have occurred on 5 August and the following days, OHCHR has continued to receive reports of violent attacks against Awami League supporters since the interim government came to power on 8 August.
For example, Awami League supporters who had come to commemorate the assassination of former President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 were attacked by BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami supporters, although some students tried to intervene. Dozens of people, including many female Awami League supporters, were injured, and an Awami League leader was reported to have died two weeks after the incident in the August 15 attack. According to several witnesses, on August 14, a group led by local BNP supporters attacked a factory owned by a prominent Awami League supporter and attacked workers to extort money from the owner. The factory was burned down in the second attack. Police did not return any phone calls during the two attacks, and did not properly investigate.
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Although OHCHR is unable to provide any statistics on retaliatory violence, particularly attacks on Awami League leaders and activists and police members, detailed information received from the Awami League indicates that 144 officials and members of the Awami League and its affiliated organizations were killed in attacks between July 1 and August 15. Of these, 23 were killed by August 3, 35 by August 4, 68 by August 5, and another 18 by August 6 to 15.
OHCHR could not independently verify the veracity of this information.
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According to the Bangladesh Police, 44 police officers were killed and 2,308 others were injured between July 1 and August 15. 394 The BDR (Border Guard Bangladesh) reported that three border guards were killed and 129 were injured. 395 Three Ansar/VDP (Village Defence Force) officers were killed and 63 were injured. 396 Two Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) officers were killed and 307 were injured.
Journalists and media outlets were also targeted by retaliatory violence, which was seen as biased towards the Awami League and supportive of the former government. On August 5, shortly after Sheikh Hasina left the country, violent mobs attacked several TV stations and burned or vandalized them. One of these stations, Ekattor TV, had already been attacked on August 3 by a mob armed with sticks and stones, who looked different from the other protesters.
On 5 August, hundreds of people attacked the station again and eventually forced their way in, then looted and burned the station. A mob of locals and student protesters attacked and set fire to Somoy TV. The attackers at ATN News TV physically attacked two journalists and two other staff members, as well as vandalizing and looting the station. Other attacks on 5 August targeted ATN Bangla, DBC News, My TV, Bijoy TV and Gazi TV. On 7 August, a mob of 200 people, armed with firearms and shouting BNP slogans, forced their way into the Mohana TV station. They beat up a senior journalist and demanded money not to vandalize or burn the station.
A significant number of journalists have been charged with murder and other violent crimes. Several prominent journalists, considered supporters of the Awami League, have been arrested on the basis of such cases. Concerns have been expressed that these cases have been exaggerated. In October, the interim government formed a committee to monitor cases of harassment against journalists working in the media. In an interview on November 21, the interim government’s chief adviser publicly admitted that the murder cases were “hastily filed following old laws and practices.”
The Bangladesh government has stressed that the # cases against journalists were filed by the victims in accordance with existing laws and that the government had no involvement in the filing of the # cases. The government has stated that the investigation will be conducted fairly and the real perpetrators will be identified.
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Many journalists and other civil society observers have experienced a climate of intimidation since August 5, where journalists and media organizations have been warned against publishing any news or reporting that could be perceived as pro-Awami League or against its political opponents.
Persecution against members of religious and indigenous groups
- Bangladesh is home to diverse communities and groups, who are religiously, ethnically, or linguistically distinct from the majority Bengali-speaking Sunni Muslim population. These communities and groups have suffered from structural and deep-rooted social #discrimination, which is based on historical events and a constitutional framework that emphasizes the country’s Bengali and Islamic identity despite prohibiting #discrimination. Particularly in times of political unrest, these groups have been the targets of conspiracies and victims of hate crimes. Their genuine concerns have often been the subject of misinformation, distortion, and exploitation for broader national and regional political ends unrelated to their own plight.
- OHCHR conducted 34 interviews regarding attacks on distinct religious and indigenous groups, including 12 victims who were targeted between 1 July and 15 August 2024. OHCHR also met with representatives of various communities, as well as civil society, human rights and minority rights activists and members of religious organizations, law enforcement officials and media representatives. However, detailed information on some allegations, including sexual violence, in certain areas has not been verified or requires further investigation. Confirming the true extent of violence against these groups has proven challenging, particularly as reports from campaigns and religious organizations often conflict to varying degrees with those of journalists on the ground. In addition, some of the allegations reported to OHCHR occurred in remote areas and, given the current situation and the limited resources available to OHCHR, it was not possible to collect direct statements.
- Nevertheless, the information provided by interviewees paints a broad picture of violence against specific communities based on religious, ethnic and political bias, with incidents centered around the destruction of property and the suppression of alternative identities. Political unrest and incidents such as police station occupations have exacerbated the security challenges faced by distinct religious and indigenous groups, particularly Hindus, indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and Ahmadiyya Muslims. The reasons behind such attacks include religious and ethnic # discrimination, the opportunity to retaliate against minority supporters of the Awami League #, and local disputes over land and personal issues. OHCHR acknowledges that misinformation has obscured the root causes of several incidents and places great emphasis on verified sources in reporting on these incidents. Despite the above obstacles, OHCHR was able to gather sufficient information to understand a pattern of subsequent events and to highlight the need for detailed investigations into the incidents.
- #attacks and demolitions on Hindu homes, businesses, and temples
Immediately after the fall of the previous government, reports of attacks were received in Sylhet, Khulna and Rangpur, in addition to conflict-prone areas like Thakurgaon, Lalmonirhat and Dinajpur. Such attacks mainly took place in places where members of the Hindu community were perceived to be supporters of the Awami League, as this perception has been established historically.
OHCHR interviewed some #Hindu businessmen and homeowners in these areas, who reported that their businesses, homes, land and religious sites were targeted, as well as shops owned by Hindus being #looted. #The types of attacks included destruction of property, #arson and physical threats, combined with police inaction, tactical impunity for attackers and political motives. For example, one interviewee said that Hindu crematoriums and #temples in Thakurgaon were #vandalized, and other witnesses described how, after attacks on their property, some 3,000–4,000 Hindus from those villages, fearing sectarian violence, took refuge near the Indian border, but were turned back by India’s Border Security Force (BSF). Affected families reported widespread insecurity and huge financial losses, with many losing essential items, livestock, and entire businesses.
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Witness and victim accounts indicate that the attacks were primarily carried out by individuals involved in “victory marches” celebrating the fall of the former government. While the identities of the perpetrators of these attacks were not always clear, witnesses to some incidents testified that the attackers were supporters of local BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and other organized groups. However, there were also interventions from these political parties condemning the violence. After August 6, efforts were made at the local level by BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, student organizations, and social organizations to protect homes and places of worship of the Hindu community. Leaders of the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Anti-Discrimination Movement, as well as the interim government’s chief advisor, all issued public statements condemning the violence.
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There have been several allegations of mobs forcibly forcing the resignation of Hindu headmasters of various schools. In one such incident, the victim testified that local BNP leaders were present among the mobs.
- National Security Intelligence (NSI) information provided to OHCHR by the interim government details 37 violent attacks targeting minorities between 5 and 15 August. These #attacks occurred in Jessore, Noakhali, Patuakhali, Natore, Dinajpur, Chandpur, Shariatpur, Rangpur, Rajshahi, Khulna, Meherpur, Barguna, Barisal, Rajbari, Thakurgaon, Faridpur, Pirojpur and Netrakona. Most of the reported attacks involved the vandalism, looting or burning of one or more homes or businesses.
Four # attacks took place at temples. In some of these incidents, the victims were physically attacked, including a woman whose throat was slit and a man who was injured with a sharp weapon. Nine of the identified victims were associated with Awami League political activities. In five # attacks, the NSI report identified # BNP supporters among the attackers. In January 2025, Bangladesh Police released a report examining 1,769 # attacks and # vandalism incidents against minorities in Bangladesh from 4–20 August, which were reported by the non-governmental Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Oikya Parishad. According to police findings, 1,234 of these # attacks had a political background, 20 were communal in nature, and 161 were false claims.
Torture and oppression in the Chittagong Hill Tracts
The policy of resettling Bengalis from the plains, often with military assistance, into the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and land disputes have marginalized local populations, resulting in long-term conflict. These populations are considered indigenous peoples under the UN human rights framework.
The Bangladesh government recognizes these groups as “indigenous” rather than constitutionally recognized as ethnic minorities. A peace agreement signed in 1997 has never been fully implemented, and the military presence and internal conflict continue.
In the days following the riots, settler Bengalis harassed the #indigenous population, accusing them of being loyal to the former government. Tensions had been rising since mid-2024 due to the anti-quota movement, but rumors were also to blame. A #rumor was spread that a local university had admitted an indigenous student to the exclusion of a Bengali student, although in reality both were admitted.
Such campaigns have led to increased hate speech and intimidation efforts by Bengali groups in the Hill Tracts, some of which are also known to be linked to the military. During the protests and after 5 August, the main focus of propaganda and graffiti in the Chittagong Hill Tracts has been on local issues, including demands for the withdrawal of troops. In response, the military has focused on removing graffiti and arresting activists to suppress dissent.
These activities caused the tribals to be afraid to organize, as participation levels were low due to fears of increased military repression. According to witness testimony, on August 5, violence escalated in Bandarban, where tribal and Bengali groups had come together to protest. Some armed Bengalis arrived in trucks and attacked the residence of the local parliamentarian and physically assaulted a member of the tribal community.
# Attacks on temples, mosques, shrines and other places of worship
Bangladesh has a long history of attacks on places of worship, including temples and shrines. During the period under review in this report, between 5 and 15 August, media and other local news sources reported attacks on places of worship associated with Hindu, Ahmadiyya, Buddhist and Christian communities in various regions.
According to information available to OHCHR, three temples in Burashardubi, Hatibandha, and Lalmonirhat were attacked and set on fire, while about 20 houses were looted, reflecting widespread communal violence.
There was also an arson attack on an ISKCON temple in Meherpur. Some of the incidents reported to OHCHR highlight the complexities surrounding these attacks. For example, the Kali temple in Nandipara was attacked on 7 August, but upon investigation it became clear that the cause of the damage was not religious intolerance, but a local dispute over land ownership.
242. OHCHR has received allegations of attacks and torture against religious minorities and ethnic minorities since 15 August and recommends that these be investigated as a matter of priority and as soon as possible.
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